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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 14-1126 
________________ 
 
 
M.D. STEVEN S. SIMRING, 
United States of America, ex rel. 
  
v. 
  
RUTGERS, The State University of New Jersey; 
UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL; NEW JERSEY MEDICAL SCHOOL; 
JAMES LAWLER; JOHN DOES 1-25, (Employees of University of Medicine and 
Dentistry), UMDNJ-University 
Hospital and/or New Jersey Medical School; CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD 
UNIVERSITY PHYSICIAN ASSOCIATES; 
MICHAEL SAULICH; CATHERINE GIBBONS; UNIVERSITY PHYSICIAN 
ASSOCIATES OF NEW JERSEY INC. 
 
       M.D. Steven S. Simring, 
         Appellant 
 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-04-cv-03530) 
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 2, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 7, 2015) 
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________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, 
 
There are few cases judges like less than disputes over attorneys’ fees.  And the 
tedium of reviewing reams of spreadsheets in the service of lining lawyers’ pockets is 
exponentially greater for district and magistrate judges than for us on appeal.  
Nonetheless, we must review fee applications and draft clear accounts of why a fee is 
awarded or not.  The District Court in this case put in yeoman’s work trying to guide the 
parties to a negotiated settlement, but when the parties’ intransigence forced the Court to 
rule on the fee petition, it did not include enough information in its opinion to allow for 
meaningful appellate review.  With regret, though we affirm in part, we also vacate in 
part and remand. 
I. Background 
This appeal results from Dr. Steven S. Simring’s False Claims Act (FCA) suit 
alleging that the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (now part of 
Rutgers University) engaged in a lengthy, multimillion-dollar scheme to bill taxpayers 
twice for the same services.  The FCA was passed during the Civil War to root out frauds 
perpetrated by contractors with the Government.  It allows private individuals to sue on 
behalf of the United States; such Plaintiffs are called “relators,” as the law also requires 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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them to transmit (or “relate”) their allegations to the Government.  The United States 
must decide whether to intervene in the relator’s lawsuit, lending the Government’s 
substantial expertise, negotiating leverage, and investigative resources to the cause. 
When Simring filed the suit, Henry F. Furst was his lawyer.  Simring informed the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) of his allegations, and the DOJ launched an 
investigation to determine whether it would intervene.  The United States’ decision to 
intervene (or not) is typically the most consequential moment of an FCA case.  Hence, in 
representing Simring Furst devoted much of his energy to convincing the DOJ to take 
part in the case.  For assistance in this crucial task, he enlisted Harry Litman, a former 
U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania and now a well-regarded lawyer 
in private practice.  In 2008, four years after Simring notified the DOJ of his case, the 
Government decided to intervene, and in June 2009 the parties settled for $4.45 million 
(this and all other large numbers in our opinion are approximate).   
The FCA entitles a prevailing relator to “reasonable attorneys’ fees.”  31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(d)(1), and after the settlement Simring promptly sought to recover fees for Furst 
and Litman.  When he did not immediately succeed, Simring engaged the law firm of 
Stone & Magnanini.  Regrettably, the litigation over Furst and Litman’s fees has lasted 
six years so far, and this appeal is but the latest—and not the last—chapter.  
In December 2010, Simring petitioned the District Court for a total of $1.08 
million in aggregate fees and costs to compensate Furst, Litman, and Stone & Magnanini.  
The petition consisted of the lawyers’ billing records, their hourly rates, and evidence of 
the rates of other lawyers in the community.  Though Rutgers did not dispute Simring’s 
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entitlement to fees, it argued that Furst and Litman charged too high a rate for too many 
hours.  In October 2012, a Magistrate Judge drafted a Report and Recommendation 
(R&R) suggesting that Stone & Magnani be awarded nothing and that the other lawyers 
receive in total $366,000.  Simring promptly lodged objections with the District Court, 
which allowed Stone & Magnanini to file a petition for work performed up to May 8, 
2013.  The Court then modified the recommended ruling in part to award Stone & 
Magnanini $313,000 and to increase the compensation for Litman by $54,000 (the 
aggregate fees awarded were thus $733,000).  Simring moved for reconsideration, and 
the motion was granted in part on December 16, 2013, to award $18,000 previously 
denied for engaging a consultant who advised on encouraging DOJ intervention.   
On December 31, Simring petitioned for attorneys’ fees for work done between 
May 8 and December 31.  The District Court denied this motion.  Simring appeals, 
arguing that Furst and Litman remain not fully compensated for their work before May 8, 
2013, and that all his lawyers were entitled to compensation for their work after that date.  
We refer to the R&R, and the District Judge’s opinion insofar as it approved the R&R, 
collectively as the decision of “the District Court,” and when we mean to differentiate 
between the Judges’ decisions, we discuss the opinion of the District Judge or the 
Magistrate Judge. 
II. Discussion 
 A. Governing Law 
A relator must receive “reasonable” attorneys’ fees when an FCA suit results in a 
settlement in which the defendant agrees to pay money.  31 U.S.C. § 3703(d).  Fees are 
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presumed reasonable when calculated using the “lodestar” method, by which a court 
assigns a reasonable hourly rate and multiplies that rate by the reasonable number of 
hours expended on the litigation.  Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean 
Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564 (1986).  In calculating the fee, a court may assign different rates 
or amounts of time to different categories of tasks.  For example, a district court acts 
within its discretion when it determines that it would be reasonable for an attorney to 
charge less for time spent filing papers than for drafting a brief.  Cf. id. at 567.  The total 
fee (F) is the product of the reasonable hourly rate (R) and the reasonable number of 
hours (H), or, in mathematical terms, F = R x T.  Where a court determines that different 
hourly rates or numbers of hours are appropriate for given types of tasks, it must do a 
separate calculation for each type (t) such that Ft = Rt x Ht.  The reasonable fee is the sum 
of each value for Ft. 
A reasonable hourly rate is the “prevailing [rate] in the community for similar 
services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.”  Blum v. 
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984).  To determine a reasonable number of hours, the 
starting point is the number actually spent on the litigation, but a district court may 
“exclude hours that are not reasonably expended.  Hours are not reasonably expended if 
they are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 
F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).  Compensable time includes hours 
spent on tasks “useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to secure the final result 
obtained from the litigation.”  Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 561 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  A court may deduct inadequately documented hours.  Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183. 
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 B. The Fee Applications 
  1. Matters on Which We Affirm 
The District Court held that Furst’s proposed billing rate of $450 per hour was 
reasonable.  Neither party disputes this holding. 
The Court also reduced Litman’s hourly rate from $850 per hour to $625.  Simring 
challenges this determination, as he contends that Litman charged his paying clients $850 
per hour and that the evidence Rutgers mustered to rebut the rate was unreliable.  
Although it agreed with Simring that Rutgers’ evidence in support of its proposed hourly 
rate was unhelpful, the Court considered affidavits offered in connection with Furst’s 
application to determine Litman’s rate.  Even though they were offered in support of 
Furst’s rate, to the Court they showed that a lawyer of Litman’s skill and experience in 
New Jersey would reasonably have charged $625 per hour.1   
On appeal, Simring argues that the Court erred in considering evidence offered in 
support of Furst’s—not Litman’s—rate and that it should not have looked to evidence 
Simring introduced to reduce the rate he was seeking.  Rather, he believes the Court was 
only entitled to rely on Rutgers’ evidence to dispute Litman’s rate.   But the Court was 
permitted to consider all the evidence in the record and draw reasonable inferences from 
it regardless of its proponent.  It properly “rejected the prevailing party’s evidence of 
                                              
1 The parties dispute whether the relevant community is, as Rutgers urges, New Jersey 
(where the lawsuit was filed) or, as Simring contends, Washington, D.C. (where the DOJ 
was encouraged to intervene).  We need not choose between the two because the District 
Court viewed New Jersey as the proper forum and Simring concedes that the issue “is 
ultimately immaterial.”  Reply Br. at 18. 
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rates” when that evidence failed to persuade.  Loughner v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 260 F.3d 
173, 180 (3d Cir. 2001).  Perceiving no abuse of discretion in the determination that $625 
was a reasonable hourly rate, we affirm that reduction. 
Finally, Simring claims the District Court erred in using rates in effect at the time 
the fee petitions were filed instead of when the fees were ordered.  We have held, 
however, that “[w]hen attorney’s fees are awarded, the current market rate must be used,” 
and that “the current market rate is the rate at the time of the fee petition,” Lanni v. New 
Jersey, 259 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2001), notwithstanding the delay between the time of 
the petition and the time of the final award (at least two years in Lanni, given the date of 
our mandate).  We therefore affirm the District Court’s choice of date for calculating 
Furst and Litman’s rates. 
  2. Matters on Which We Vacate 
Simring engaged three law firms in this litigation.  He presented different billing 
records for each firm involved; each sought compensation for different work at different 
hourly rates.  Those billing records should be analyzed separately except where efforts 
were duplicative.  For the most part, the District Court analyzed the lawyers’ hourly rates 
separately, but, when discussing why the hours Furst and Litman spent on certain tasks 
needed to be reduced, it analyzed those lawyers’ bills together.     
The most significant problem with the approach of not differentiating between the 
submitted billing records is that Furst and Litman had different billing methods: Furst 
“task billed,” meaning that he recorded the amount of time he spent on each discrete task 
separately, while Litman “block billed,” that is, he listed all of his tasks performed on a 
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given day and then recorded the total amount of time per day he spent on Simring’s case.  
Block billing makes it more difficult for courts to review hours expended because we do 
not know how many hours a lawyer spent on a discrete task.  For reasons that are not 
clear, the Magistrate Judge wrote her R&R as if both attorneys block billed and noted that 
this approach made it difficult to discern which tasks were compensable and which were 
not; the District Judge did not disturb this misreading of Furst’s records.  On remand, the 
Court should clarify what specific entries of each lawyer are unreasonable.  To the extent 
block billing poses problems for its review, those problems are relevant only to the 
petition for Litman’s fees, as Furst did not block bill.2  
   a. Administrative Tasks 
 The Magistrate Judge recommended that Furst and Litman’s rates be reduced to 
$95 per hour for “simple legal and/or administrative tasks that could have been 
performed by an associate, paraprofessional, or secretary.”  Mag. Op. at 23.  She cited 
three examples of these tasks, but did not inform the parties which specific time entries 
she recommended compensating at $95 per hour.  This decision makes us unable to 
determine whether the rate was appropriately reduced.  We also note that grouping 
“simple legal and/or administrative tasks” may well have conflated substantially different 
functions: a simple legal task often requires at a minimum three years of legal education 
followed by admission to the bar even to be allowed by law to perform it; a simple 
                                              
2 We note that, should the Court deem it advisable, it would act within its discretion if it 
ordered Litman to “re-format and re-submit [his] billing records” to make them more 
easily reviewable.  Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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administrative task typically does not.  Similarly, a task that must be performed by an 
associate generally ought to be compensated at a higher rate than a task that can be 
performed by a paralegal.  But we do not actually know what tasks the District Court 
considered to be worthy of this fee reduction nor how many hours they accounted for. 
   b. Reduced Billing Categories 
The Magistrate Judge further recommended several reductions to the number of 
hours contained in both lawyers’ billing records.  Specifically, she did so for: “vaguely 
described time”; “review and discussion of newspaper articles detailing breaking and 
entering at UMDNJ’s offices”; “communicating and meeting with state deputy 
attorney[s] general[]”; “negotiating and recovering Dr. Simring’s share from the 
[G]overnment”; “searching for and communicating with expert witnesses who were never 
ultimately retained”; hours spent when “counsel reviewed materials, performed legal 
research, conferred with one another, and drafted a Second Amended Complaint”; “time 
spent . . . retaining Mr. Litman’s firm, including but not limited to[] running a potential 
conflicts check[] and the possibility of retaining other counsel”; and fees for seeking fees.  
Mag. Op. 25–30.  With the exception of the recommended reduction for fees-on-fees, the 
District Judge agreed with the Magistrate Judge. 
However, neither Judge recorded how many hours these categories represented or 
which billing entries they matched.  The closest the Magistrate Judge got was the citation, 
“See Furst and Litman Billing Records,” Mag. Op. at 29, which is not a helpful indication 
of the source of her information.  We cannot review the reasonableness of these 
deductions without knowing what they were. 
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In addition to the vagueness of the reductions for the number of hours spent on 
these tasks, Simring makes well-taken objections to the District Court’s decision that any 
hours spent on three specific categories of tasks were per se unreasonable: 
communicating with the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office; preparing for possible 
expert testimony; and preparation of a second amended complaint.   
The Court disallowed time spent communicating with the State Attorney General’s 
office because “the Attorney General of New Jersey never intervened or otherwise 
formally joined in this action.”  Mag. Op. at 26.  Similarly, the Magistrate Judge cited 
that there was “no discovery in this case,” and that the experts Simring’s counsel 
communicated with were not ultimately retained, as the reasons why the hours spent 
developing an expert case were not reasonable.  Id. at 27.  The District Court also held 
that time spent drafting a second amended complaint was wasted simply for the reason 
that the document was not filed.  
The error in these reductions is that they assume it is always a waste of time to 
pursue a litigation strategy that does not produce a tangible result before the Court.  And 
although the District Judge recognized the Magistrate Judge’s overstated focus on in-
court and court-supervised advocacy, he did not disturb the Magistrate Judge’s reduction 
of hours for these tasks.  Whether the New Jersey Attorney General formally joined the 
action, whether an expert was retained, and whether a second amended complaint was 
filed, do not answer whether making those preparations was “useful and of a type 
ordinarily necessary” to the result Simring got.  Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 561.  In many 
cases, diligent lawyers will pursue many lines of inquiry both in factual investigation and 
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legal research that may not end up formally becoming a part of a court’s record.  But 
background work cannot categorically be deemed time wasted.  To be sure, if Furst and 
Litman performed these tasks to pad their bills (at a time when it was unclear whether 
they would receive anything), the hours spent on them would be unreasonable.  But if a 
reasonable FCA attorney in building her case would have consulted experts or state 
officials or would have drafted an amended complaint at the time Furst and Litman did 
so, then the requested fees can be awarded.  Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Attorney Gen. of 
State of New Jersey, 297 F.3d 253, 270–71 (3d Cir. 2002) (awarding fees for time spent 
preparing expert who did not testify).   
   c. Litman’s Legal Research 
We also vacate the reduction in Litman’s hourly rate for any day on which he did 
any legal research.  As already noted, Litman block billed, obfuscating exactly how much 
time he spent on any given task.  To address this lack of clarity, on any day in which one 
of the tasks Litman performed was listed as “legal research,” the District Court reduced 
his hourly rate from $625 to $450.   
Many Courts of Appeal have endorsed applications of across-the-board reductions 
in hourly rates due to the vagaries of block billing.  See McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 
90 (4th Cir. 2013); Torres-Rivera v. O’Neill-Cancel, 524 F.3d 331, 340 (1st Cir. 2008); 
Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007); Robinson v. City of 
Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1998).  We need not determine whether we 
agree with this approach, as we vacate on the ground that the District Court’s decision to 
apply a 39% reduction to Litman’s hourly rate to all days when he conducted legal 
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research is arbitrary.  Legal research is an essential part of a lawyer’s job and should not 
always be deemed “associate level” work.  Mag. Op. at 13.  Nor does any amount of legal 
research on a given day so infect a lawyer with indolence that the value of all the work 
done on the whole day should be reduced by more than a third.  We do not decide that 
Litman is entitled to compensation for every hour he claims; we only hold that more 
reasoning must accompany the ultimate decision. 
   d. Fees-on-Fees 
We further vacate the decision not to award fees-on-fees to Furst and Litman for 
the time spent litigating the fee petition before engaging Stone & Magnanini.  The only 
reasoning offered was that it was “unfair” to bill Rutgers for so many lawyers.  Dist. Op. 
at 5.  But the principal question is whether the product of the relevant hourly rates and the 
amount of time spent by all the lawyers and paraprofessionals involved is reasonable.  If 
the decision to bring in a third law firm resulted in a duplication of efforts, that would be 
a reasonable ground to disallow a portion of the requested fees.  Again, we do not 
necessarily quarrel with the result the District Court reached, but we simply do not have 
enough information to gauge whether that result reflected a reasonable rate charged for a 
reasonable number of hours. 
   e. Supplemental Fee Petition 
The District Court denied Simring’s petition for fees incurred between May 8 and 
December 31, 2013.  The only reasoning in the Court’s Order is that “Relator has already 
been more than reasonably compensated for the time spent by his lawyers.”  As we have 
held before, “if the district court’s fee-award opinion is so terse, vague, or conclusory that 
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we have no basis to review it, we must vacate the fee-award order and remand for further 
proceedings.”  Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2000).  It 
may be that the lawyers’ work between May and December of 2013 was entirely 
noncompensable, but before we decide we would benefit from the District Court’s 
analysis of whether the work performed was “useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to 
secure the final result obtained from the litigation.”  Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 561. 
III. Conclusion 
We affirm much of the District Court’s decision, though we vacate the fee award 
in part and remand for further proceedings.  As we do not know how the Court evaluated 
the time entries submitted, we are unable to review whether the reductions it made 
resulted in reasonable rates and hours, the two ingredients that yield a lodestar fee.  Thus 
we vacate in part and remand. 
 
